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Abstract. In this paper we analyze empirically whether and if so to what extent later 
entrants in the European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
incumbents and early mover entrants. To analyze this question we consider a series of 
static models and a dynamic model of market share development. We find a clear 
early mover advantage, mainly caused by the influence of the penetration rate: it pays 
to enter when still few people have acquired a mobile telephone. Another important 
determining factor is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the moment of entry: it is 
significantly easier to enter a highly concentrated industry. Finally, there are 
important differences between countries possibly indicating the relative strength of 
the national regulators. For example, it turns out that it is relatively difficult to enter 
the mobile telephony sector and gain market share in the Scandinavian countries. 
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Bijwaard's research is partly supported by the Netherlands Organisation for 
Scientific Research (NWO). 
 2
1. Introduction 
 
The idea that in an industry firms may have a first-mover advantage exists in the 
economics literature for many, many years. Von Stackelberg, for example, showed 
already in 1934 that in the context of quantity-setting firms a leader (first-mover) is 
able to get a larger market share and higher profits than a follower (second-mover). 
There are several reasons why first-mover advantages may arise.2 In the economics 
(see, e.g., Mueller (1997)) and strategic management (see, e.g., Lieberman and 
Montgomery (1988)) literature the following factors are mentioned where a 
distinction is made between factors working on the supply and the demand side. On 
the demand side, there is the pre-dominant importance of switching cost (Klemperer, 
1987a,b). Switching costs can arise (i) from the fact that consumers have to make 
some initial investment in adapting to a seller’s product or services, (ii) from firm-
specific learning on how to use the product (habit formation), or (iii) because of 
contractual costs imposed by the firm. With switching costs, firms that already exist 
in the market when consumers still have to make their first choice benefit as later 
firms have to offer much better deals to convince consumers to switch. Other sources 
for first-mover advantage on the demand side include network externalities and 
uncertainty about the quality other firms offer (Schmalensee, 1981). On the supply 
side, there are similar factors working to the advantage of early entrants in the market, 
most notably sunk costs and economies of scale (Schmalensee, 1982) and cost 
efficiencies through learning by doing. 
 
There is also a considerable amount of empirical literature on first-mover advantages, 
mostly in management and marketing journals (see, e.g., Urban et al., 1986, 
Kalyanaram and Urban, 1992 and Robinson et al., 1994 for an overview). Typically, 
this literature studies how market shares at a particular moment in time depend on the 
firm’s position in entering the market: what is the typical (long-run) market share of 
the pioneer firm, the second entrant, etc.? These studies are based on cross-sectional 
data from many different markets. Kalyanaram and Urban (1992) are the first to study 
                                                 
2 Of course, there are also factors pointing at advantages for late entrants in markets. In particular, later 
entrants may learn from mistakes of others or may free ride on investments (and advertisement 
expenditure making the product known by a large group of consumers) made by early entrants. Also, 
they typically may enter when technological or demand uncertainties are considerably smaller. 
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a combination of cross-section data and time series. They also consider the impact of 
factors such as price differences, relative advertising expenditures, relative quality 
perception, etc. on the development of market shares. Their model allows a 
comparison in the rate of convergence to an asymptotic market share level by later 
entrants. Pioneering advantage is also related to the time a firm (or brand) is in the 
market. Longer lead time, which is the time between entries, should increase this 
advantage. Two papers by Huff and Robinson (1994) and Brown and Lattin (1994) 
confirm this for frequently purchased consumer goods and show that the pioneering 
advantage declines over time with competition. An overview of earlier and later 
studies can be found in Lieberman and Montgomery (1988, 1998) and in Robinson et 
al. (1994). 
 
The vast majority of empirical studies finds that market pioneers have substantially 
higher market shares than later entrants. This strong association between order of 
entry and market share is questioned by some authors (e.g. Golder and Tellis (1993)). 
They argue that most of the empirical studies have potential limitations. One such a 
limitation is the fact that entry is usually treated as an exogenous parameter, whereas 
timing of entry of a firm might be a choice variable that depends on the perceived 
market expectations after entry. Moore et al. (1991) extended the Robinson and 
Fornell (1985) model to allow for the possibility that market entry is endogenous.  
 
This paper studies whether early entrants in the European mobile telephony sector 
have benefited through a long-term larger market share from their pioneering 
activities. The paper makes three types of contributions. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper studying the consequences of the order of entry 
using data from one particular sector where consumers buy infrequently. A 
disadvantage of traditional cross-section analysis is the potentially large differences 
between sectors in the data set. Ideally, one would like to have a (large) number of 
entrants in one or similar market(s). There are not many cases where such conditions 
apply. European telecommunication in the 1990s is an exception. In the 1990s 
telephone services were liberalized in many European countries and with the advent 
of mobile telephony more and more operators entered the different markets over time. 
The problem of endogeneity pointed at above does not arise in our case as the timing 
of entry can (to a large extent) be considered an exogenous variable due to the fact 
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that firms can only enter the market at times the government was willing to sell 
additional licenses. The data set we use is unique in the sense that it contains monthly 
data about market shares in all Western European countries. In the next section, where 
we describe the data we used for this study in more detail, it will become clear that 
there are 46 market introductions in this period and that the development of the 
telecom sectors in the different countries is quite similar to each other. The telecom 
sector in the 1990s is therefore an ideal case to consider empirically the impact of the 
timing of entry into a market. 
 
Second, from a policy perspective, the mobile telephony sector has attracted quite a 
bit of attention. Competition authorities and regulators have tried to ensure that the 
interests of entrants are well taken care of. A consistent empirical investigation of the 
success or failure of this policy has, however, been lacking up to this point. We will 
study in detail how the order of entry has co-determined how the market shares of 
firms have evolved over time in different countries. Third, because of the nature of 
our data set, we are able to estimate whether there are systematic differences between 
the way market shares of entrants develop in different European countries. Therefore, 
we can answer the question in which countries it is more and less difficult for entrants 
to enter the mobile telephony market. 
 
The questions we are interested in are the following. What are the main success 
factors determining the growth in market shares of entrants? In particular, what is the 
impact of (the growth in) market penetration, measured as the percentage of the 
population that already has a mobile telephone; and what is the impact of factors such 
as the number of incumbents and the market concentration at the moment of entry?  
 
The main empirical studies we know of the European Telecommunications industry 
are the two papers by Gruber and Verboven (2001a,b). These papers study a related, 
but very different question, namely whether the diffusion rate of mobile telephones in 
a country depends on the degree of competition. They find that that such a positive 
relationship exists, but that it is relatively weak compared to the national differences 
in diffusion speed. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a global 
description of the development of the main features of European telephony markets 
and it describes the data set we have. Section 3 discusses the structure of the models 
we use to analyze the data. In Section 4 we give an overview of the different results 
and provide an interpretation. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The European Mobile Telephony Markets 
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, most European countries had one incumbent firm 
offering telephone services to the population.3 Mobile telephony was at its infancy. 
This incumbent company usually was a state monopolist. At that time European 
telephony markets were being liberalized and the former state monopolists gradually 
became privately owned companies with a monopoly position. During the 1990s these 
companies started offering mobile telephony services and governments started issuing 
licenses to new companies, sometimes using auctions to allocate the licenses among 
the interested firms. Each of these licenses entitled the owner to use a certain 
spectrum band to offer mobile telephony services to its clients. The fact that a license 
is needed to operate in the market implies that the timing of entry is not a choice 
variable in the same sense as it is in other markets. Here, the only choice firms have is 
to enter at a time the government issues new licenses or not to enter at all. 
 
National regulators were given the task to force incumbent companies to allow other 
firms access to their fixed network (under the so-called essential facilities doctrine) 
and also to look after the fact that in the mobile telephony sector two-way access was 
granted so that subscribers to one network could easily call subscribers to other 
networks at fair prices (see, e.g., Cave et al., 2002). One of the goals the national 
governments had set for the mobile telephony sector was to create a situation where 
firms with their own network could compete with one another so that the regulation 
problem of creating access to the fixed telephony network of the incumbent firm 
would not arise. Apart from firms with their own network, nowadays most countries 
                                                 
3 France and the U.K. had already two mobile operators in 1990; Greece had none. In Greece and the 
UK, two firms started simultaneously, so in these two countries there were two incumbent firms. In 
UK: BT and Vodafone started both in January 1985. In Greece: TIM and Vodafone started both in July 
1993. 
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also have active mobile virtual operators that roam on the network of others to offer 
their services to clients. 
 
When the market for mobile telephony services gradually took off (see also Figure 1), 
it were primarily businesses that formed the clientele. Consumers entered the market 
only more towards the end of the 1990s in most countries. The start-up of consumer 
markets has lead to a dramatic increase in the penetration rate around the turn of the 
millennium. The agents on the demand side that create, however, the largest telephone 
traffic (the businesses) usually chose to buy their mobile telephony services from the 
incumbent parties or the very early entrants. Moreover, later entrants4 needed time to 
build a reliable network with country-wide coverage, creating temporary quality 
differences at the time the later entrants entered the market.  
 
Switching costs and network effects may explain early entrants dominance in the 
mobile telephony markets in the following way. Switching cost arise in several ways. 
First, for a long time firms were able to prevent number portability so that consumers 
could not continue to use their “own” telephone number when switching firms. The 
time and effort it takes to inform friends or business relations of the change in number 
is a considerable switching cost, certainly for the larger users. In most countries, 
national regulators were able to enforce number portability in recent years, so that this 
type of switching costs does not exist anymore. However, other forms of switching 
costs continue to be prevalent, most notably the terms of the subscription contracts 
(one to two years) and the time it takes to adapt to a firm’s services. Because of the 
switching costs, one may expect that there is a premium to entering the market when 
the penetration rate is still low. 
 
Network effects prevail for two reasons. First, on the supply side the sector’s 
technology is one with large fixed costs (the cost of creating and maintaining a 
network) and very small marginal costs. Hence, if all firms are equally efficient, the 
firm with the largest market share has the lowest average cost. This firm therefore 
may price below its competitors thereby further increasing its market share. A larger 
                                                 
4 Entrants are certainly not necessarily weak parties. The European market is populated with relatively 
few firms that compete in several countries. Therefore, a later entrant in one country typically is an 
incumbent firm in another country. 
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firm also has more possibilities to invest in its network thereby offering a more 
reliable service. A second source of network effects arises in some countries where 
firms are allowed to charge different prices for calls terminating on their own network 
and calls terminating on the network of others. This pricing strategy may induce 
consumers to subscribe to the firm where most friends are also subscribed to. 
 
2.1. Description of the data 
 
In this subsection we describe the data we used for our analysis. We have selected the 
following sixteen European countries to work with: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These are the larger countries 
in which there are at least two mobile operators active in the market. In most other 
countries, such as in Luxembourg and other smaller countries, no market 
introductions have taken place. For each country, the data set contains information on: 
market penetration (the percentage of the population that has a mobile telephone), the 
number and names of the active operators and their market shares. No information is 
available on other potential relevant factors such as the prices that the companies 
charge for their services.5 
 
Since 1991, forty-four introductions (new operators that enter the market) have taken 
place in these countries (two incumbents, forty-two entrants). The tables presented in 
the appendix provide the names of incumbents and entrants in different countries, in 
total sixty-one telecom operators. For the years 1998 – September 2004 we have 
monthly data at our disposal. For the years 1990 - 1997 only yearly data (of December 
each year) are available. The data set contains market shares of those companies that 
have their own network, leaving the mobile virtual operators that subcontract the use 
of a network out of the dataset. We have revised the data with respect to measurement 
errors or other improbable data. As for our dynamic analysis (see Section 4 below) a 
time series of sufficient length is necessary, we have carried out an interpolation of 
the yearly data for the years 1990 up to 1997 to get an approximation of the monthly 
figures. This has been done for both the penetration rate and for the market shares. 
                                                 
5 If price data were available, these were very difficult to use, as most companies offer an extensive 
menu of price choices to their clients. 
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Details on the data on penetration rates and markets shares and the interpolation 
methodology used, will be discussed below.  
 
Penetration rate  
The penetration rate in the different countries is depicted in Figure 1 as a function of 
time. Each country is described by a different curve. The three countries where 
mobile telephony took off at a distinguished earlier moment are the three 
Scandinavian countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden.  
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Figure 1. Development of penetration rate in different countries 
 
The picture suggests that the development of the penetration rate over time follows 
the familiar S-curve (see also Gruber and Verboven (2001a,b) for the European 
Mobile Telephony Markets). It also shows that the development in each country 
follows a very similar pattern. The missing monthly data over the period 1990-1997 
are therefore for each country and each successive year interpolated on the basis of 
this curve (or logistic approach).6  
                                                 
6 For this approach two parameters are needed, a constant and a parameter that measures the time 
effect. From the observed penetration rate in, for example, ultimo 1991 and ultimo 1992, the constant 
and the time effect for the interpolation over this period can directly be derived by equalizing the 
function on time 12 (the time is in months and the time is set to 0 for ultimo 1990) to the observation of 
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Market shares 
For each entrant we have analyzed how its market share develops over time, from the 
moment of introduction onwards.7 The developments in market shares measured in 
this way are depicted in Figure 2. One can easily see that an average firm’s market 
share increases most steeply immediately after entering the market. Moreover, a 
rough first impression suggests that the increase in market shares flattens off to 
become more or less stable after approximately 40 months after entry. The figure also 
shows that one entrant has been particularly successful. This is the Greek firm 
Cosmote. Cosmote is the only mobile telephone company in Europe that is (i) a 
subsidiary of the former state monopolist and national incumbent in the fixed 
telephony market and (ii) not the first entrant in the mobile market. Apart from the 
possibility that Cosmote had a particularly successful marketing strategy,8 these facts 
may explain its unusual development. 
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Figure 2. Development of market shares (introduction from 1998 onwards) 
 
For the dynamic analysis, market share data are interpolated over the years 1990 – 
1997 in an indirect way. Because the sum of the market shares (per country) has, by 
                                                                                                                                            
the penetration rate (in the respective country) on ultimo 1991, and the function on time 24 to the 
penetration rate on ultimo 1992.  
7 The moment of introduction starts when the number of subscribers becomes positive. 
8 This is what is argued for in Knyphausen-Aufseß et al. (2002). 
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definition, to be equal to 1 we interpolate the market shares indirectly, namely by 
interpolating the number of subscribers of an operator. From the number of 
subscribers to a firm’s network, the firm’s market share can easily be derived by 
dividing through the total number of active users at a particular point in time. 
 
3. The Models 
 
In order to investigate the impact of the number of incumbents and the penetration 
rate on the development of market shares of entrants, we have investigated two types 
of models: (i) a series of static models and (ii) a dynamic model. 
 
The analysis of the static models is restricted to the period over which we have 
monthly data available. Instead of directly investigating the developments in market 
shares, we analyze how the number of costumers of the entrants expressed as 
percentage of the total population depends on the number of entrants and the change 
in the penetration rate. We have chosen to do this for the following reason. Because of 
the presence of switching cost, we are mainly interested in which percentage of the 
new adopters (those who first buy a subscription to mobile telephony) will buy from 
the entrant. By choosing the explanatory variable in this way, the estimated 
coefficient for the change in penetration rate measures exactly how large this 
percentage is.  
 
We have carried out these static analyses at different moments in time to get an idea 
of the development over time: 1, 2 and 3 months after introduction, and then 6, 12, 18, 
24, 30 and 36 months after introduction. 
 
The linear model we use is as follows:9 
itittit xpn 321 ξξξ +∆+=  
where: 
 itn  : the number of costumers of entrant i expressed as a percentage of the  
  total population at time t;  
                                                 
9 In the dynamic analysis we also include the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as an explanatory variable. 
In the static analysis this additional variable did not produce statistically significant results. 
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 ∆pit : the change in penetration rate measured from the moment of 
introduction of firm i to t months after introduction; the variable takes   
on values between 0 and 1; 
xi : the number of incumbent parties at the moment of market  
  introduction of firm i;10 
 s'ξ  : parameters. 
 
The parameters in this linear model are easily interpretable. As explained above, t2ξ  
measures the percentage of new adopters since the moment firm i entered the market 
that have chosen to buy mobile telephony services from firm i. The parameter t3ξ  
measures the impact of one additional incumbent on the percentage of the population 
that has chosen to buy mobile telephony services from firm i since the moment firm i 
entered the market. 
 
The dynamic analysis attempts to explain the course of development of the market 
share over the time a firm is present in the market place. To understand the model 
used, it is useful to reconsider the data presented in the previous section (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 shows that the market shares do not increase linearly over time. Instead, 
market shares first increase more rapidly (in the first months after market 
introduction). Subsequently, the increase in market share slows down and after some 
time a more or less stable market share is reached. To capture this aspect of the 
development in the empirical analysis we propose a non-linear model in the spirit of 
Kalyanaram and Urban (1992). In such a model two parameters are crucial: the 
ultimate level the market share finally reaches and the speed with which the market 
share converges to this level. The model below is one of the simplest mathematical 
expressions that captures these two aspects: 
 ),1( tiit iem
βγ −−=  
where: 
itm  : the market share of firm i t months after introduction, taking on 
              values between 0 and 1; 
 t  : time measured in months after introduction; 
                                                 
10 When another firm has entered before firm i we have treated this firm as an incumbent firm no 
matter how many month ago it entered the market itself.  
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 β, γ : parameters that may differ between different firms. 
 
The parameter γi has a clear interpretation: it is the ultimate level to which the market 
share of firm i converges. The parameter β determines the speed of convergence. In 
the dynamic analysis we have these parameters being determined by a number of 
exogenous factors. For γ we have chosen the following specification: 
iiii cmmppi e
+++= 3221 αααγ , 
where:11 
p : the penetration rate at the moment of introduction; the variable takes 
              on values between 0 and 1; 
 mm : the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the moment of market 
                          introduction, measuring market power, taking on values between 0 
                          and 1; 
c : a dummy variable for each country; 
α : parameters. 
 
We have chosen an exponential functional form for γ to assure it is always positive. 
We also introduced both the penetration rate itself as the penetration rate squared. One 
would expect a negative relationship between market penetration rate at the moment 
of entry and ultimate market share. The relationship may, however, be non-linear, as 
the size of this negative relationship may become much stronger when market 
penetration rate is already quite large at the moment of entry. Moreover, it may be 
that there is an optimal moment (read: optimal penetration rate) to enter the market. 
This may be the case when α2 is negative and α1 is positive. The country dummy 
measures the fact that the institutional environment may make market entry much 
easier in one country than in another.  
 
For β we have chosen the following specification: 
 ittti pmm ∆++= 321 ββββ , 
where:  
                                                 
11 Because of the high degree of correlation between the number of incumbents and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, we have only incorporated this latter variable. 
 13
itmm  : the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at time period t measured after entry 
              of player i; 
itp∆  : the change in penetration rate measured from the moment of 
              introduction; 
 β’s : parameters. 
 
This specification allows the convergence speed to the ultimate market share to 
depend on the development of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index over time and on the 
change in penetration rate. One would expect the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to have 
a positive impact on the speed of convergence: it is easier to enter a more 
concentrated industry. The change in penetration rate also should have a positive 
impact on the speed of convergence: The more the penetration rate has changed, the 
more new consumers in the market and the easier it is to gain market share. 
 
The specification above is very flexible. It takes the smoothing of the growth of the 
market shares over time into account. Furthermore, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
determines both the speed of growth in market share of firms as well as the level of 
the ultimate market share. The penetration rate at the moment of introduction co-
determines to what level the market share of a firm can grow, and the change of the 
penetration rate in a certain month co-determines how fast the market share of a firm 
in that month grows. Finally, we introduce country dummies to measure country 
specific differences, most notably the impact the national regulators have in protecting 
the interests of entrants. In the next section we will estimate the size of these effects 
on the basis of the data. 
 
4. Analysis 
 
In the first two subsections of this section we discuss the empirical results we 
obtained from estimating the two alternative models. The last subsection discusses in 
detail the question whether a potential simultaneity issue is hidden in the analysis. In 
particular, it may be that changes in market penetration not only determine the growth 
in market share of an entrant, but also that the very fact that a new party enters the 
market may have a positive impact on changes in market penetration. As we do not 
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have enough data on other potentially relevant variables, we cannot estimate a 
simultaneous model where the mutual dependence is modeled. The last subsection 
therefore discusses an instrumental variable method to deal with this issue.  
 
4.1. Analysis of the static models 
 
We start the analysis by estimating the parameters of the static models at different 
durations after entry. The results are given in the “OLS column” of the table below.  
 
Estimation results of static analyses 
      
  OLS     IV      
Month Intercept Delpen Providers R2 Intercept Delpen Providers R2 
Hausman t-
test 
1 0.003 0.042 -0.001 0.388 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.273 -0.870 
 (3.05) (2.31) (-2.37)   (2.76) (0.11) (-2.45)     
2 0.004 0.071 -0.001 0.358 0.006 -0.009 -0.001 0.072 -1.380 
 (1.95) (2.77) (-1.67)   (2.08) (-0.12) (-1.80)     
3 0.007 0.101 -0.002 0.479 0.011 0.020 -0.002 0.288 -1.051 
 (2.17) (3.55) (-2.10)   (2.01) (0.22) (-2.14)     
6 0.018 0.127 -0.004 0.502 0.026 0.056 -0.005 0.425 -0.775 
 (2.26) (3.29) (-2.43)   (2.00) (0.56) (-2.46)     
12 0.047 0.179 -0.013 0.592 0.044 0.193 -0.013 0.591 0.156 
 (2.60) (3.55) (-3.34)   (1.80) (2.05) (-3.27)     
18 0.083 0.183 -0.021 0.643 0.081 0.189 -0.021 0.642 0.122 
 (3.37) (3.93) (-3.90)   (3.05) (2.91) (-4.16)     
24 0.093 0.233 -0.028 0.601 0.091 0.240 -0.028 0.600 0.133 
 (2.72) (4.33) (-3.30)   (2.74) (3.48) (-3.55)     
30 0.096 0.272 -0.032 0.603 0.095 0.276 -0.032 0.603 0.081 
 (2.11) (4.17) (-3.08)   (2.14) (3.72) (-3.35)     
           
Delpen: change in penetration rate 
t-value between brackets       
 
Table 1. Estimation results of static analyses 
 
There are some important results that attract the attention. First, all the estimated 
parameters have the expected signs: changes in the penetration rate have a positive 
impact, while the number of incumbents has a negative impact on the relative number 
of consumers an entrant is able to attract. More incumbents imply more competitors 
and therefore a smaller share of consumers choosing for the entrant. On the other 
hand, it is much easier to attract consumers who are choosing their first mobile phone 
operator than inducing consumers to switch operators. Therefore, when many new 
 15
consumers are entering the market it is easier to gain market share than when the 
change in penetration rate is low. Almost all parameter estimates are significantly 
different from zero and, although the model is relatively simple and it was not 
possible to include an important factor such as price (due to non-availability of data), 
the model is able to explain a large fraction (between 50 and 60% for the analysis 
from 6 months onwards) of the fluctuations in the data.  
 
Most striking is that the parameter values increase with the time span considered after 
entry. Right after entry an entrant is on average able to get 4% of the new consumers, 
while two years after entry an average entrant is able to get more than 25% of the new 
consumers who have started to use mobile telephones since the date of entry. This 
increase in the ability to attract new users can be explained by referring to two factors. 
First, entrants usually need some time to build up a complete network with a nation-
wide coverage. In the beginning of their existence, they therefore do not offer the 
same quality and during this period consumers will prefer one of the incumbent 
operators that already have an optimal coverage. A second reason may be that also for 
entrants it is important to build up reputation, which simply takes time. We do not 
find evidence of a “shock therapy”, according to which entrants have to attract their 
costumers in the first months after entry.  
 
The impact of the number of incumbents grows from a negligible number to an effect 
of a 3% reduction for each additional incumbent. This means that other things being 
equal the difference in ability to attracting new clients between a first entrant (2nd 
player in the market) and a third entrant (4th player in the market) is just 6%. Of 
course, another important difference between the first and third entrant is the fact that 
the penetration rate at the moment of market entry is higher for the third entrant. 
Given the estimations on the impact of changes in penetration rate, we conclude that 
the change in the penetration rate is more important than the number of incumbents in 
the market.   
 
4.2. Analysis of the dynamic models 
 
The estimates of the dynamic model give additional insight in the development of 
market shares. The results are reported in Table 2 below.  
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Gamma parameter 
std 
error t-value 
 Country dummies    
 Austria -1.900 0.076 -25.06 
 Belgium -2.259 0.074 -30.62 
 Denmark -2.411 0.074 -32.55 
 Finland -2.894 0.084 -34.57 
 France -2.298 0.056 -41.41 
 Germany -2.523 0.059 -42.87 
 Greece -1.315 0.063 -20.83 
 Ireland -1.843 0.085 -21.64 
 Italy -2.013 0.080 -25.12 
 Netherlands -2.329 0.073 -31.88 
 Norway -2.440 0.083 -29.29 
 Portugal -1.896 0.070 -27.27 
 Spain -2.192 0.072 -30.27 
 Sweden -2.624 0.078 -33.84 
 Switzerland -2.182 0.099 -21.98 
 UK -2.125 0.048 -44.40 
 Country characteristics    
 Penetration-rate at entry -0.307 0.178 -1.72 
 Penetration-rate at entry (squared) -2.351 0.168 -14.01 
 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index just 
before entry 1.333 0.066 20.11 
     
Beta     
 Time since entry (t) 0.027 0.002 15.14 
 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at t -0.004 0.002 -1.52 
 Change in penetration rate at t 0.178 0.021 8.54 
     
     
(Pseudo-R2) 0.9740   
     
 
Table 2. Estimation results for the dynamic model 
 
We first look at the variables that explain the level to which the market shares 
eventually converge. A first striking factor is that the impact of the penetration rate is 
highly non-linear. There is very little difference between entering the market when the 
penetration rate is 10 or when it is 20%. However, when the penetration rate becomes 
quite large, the ultimate market share to be reached is very small. This follows from 
the large negative estimated impact (-2.35) of the squared penetration rate and the 
relatively low estimated impact (-0.3) of the penetration rate itself. To get some idea 
of the impact of the penetration rate on the ultimate market share compare (ceteris 
paribus) two situations, the first being a situation where a firm enters when the 
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penetration rate is 10%, the other when it is 70%.12 In the first situation the entrant 
will get an estimated ultimate market share of 19.8%, whereas it will only reach a 
market share of 5.3% in the second situation. 
 
A second important fact is that the market concentration measure (HHI) is positive 
and highly significant vindicating the idea that it is much easier to enter and gain 
market share in a highly concentrated market than when there are a few firms 
competing with each other. To get an idea of the size of this effect compare again 
(ceteris paribus) two situations. In the first situation a firm enters when there is one 
incumbent firms and the HHI is 1, the second where there are already 3 active parties 
and the HHI is 0.4.13 The estimated ultimate market share in the first case is 34%, 
whereas it is just 15.4% in the second case 
 
Finally, the difference between countries is quite striking. The average parameter 
value of the country dummies is approximately –2.1. Some countries (most notably 
the Scandinavian countries) have much lower estimates, implying that entrants have a 
hard time gaining market share, possibly due to different types of policies the 
regulators have to protect the interest of entrants. In other countries (most notably 
Austria, Greece,14 Ireland and Portugal) it is much easier for entrants to gain market 
share. To see the impact of the difference in countries compare a country (such as 
Austria, Ireland and Portugal) with a country dummy of -1.8 and a country (such as 
Sweden) with a country dummy of -2.6. A firm that enters these countries at the same 
point in time, e.g., when the penetration rate is 30% and the HHI is 0.4, gets an 
ultimate market share of 20.8%, respectively 9.3%. 
 
Concerning the speed of convergence, it is interesting to observe that the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index is not significant. Apparently, besides its important impact on the 
ultimate market share, this index does not play a significant role in determining the 
speed of convergence. All other estimated parameters have the expected sign and are 
significantly different from zero. 
 
                                                 
12 Assume an average country (dummy constant -2.1) and the HHI being 0.4.  
13 Assume an average country (dummy constant -2.1) and the penetration rate being 30% in both cases.  
14 The estimate for Greece may be so low because of the special case of Cosmote discussed above. 
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Another way to interpret the results is by simulating the development of market shares 
over time in a controlled situation. Figure 3 below considers a country where a first 
entrant enters the market when the penetration rate is 5%, a second entrant enters 
when the penetration rate is 22% and the HHI is 0.58, a third entrant enters when the 
penetration rate is 40% and the HHI is 0.38 and a fourth entrant enters when the 
penetration rate is 53% and the HHI is 0.29. The moment of entry of the respective 
parties can be read from the figure. One can easily see from the figure that the first 
entrant is still able to gain quite a large market share and in the long run approach the 
market share of the incumbent. Later entrants, however, stay at much lower market 
shares. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90
Months since Pioneer's entry
M
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
Pioneer
2nd provider
3rd provider
4th provider
5th provider
 
Figure 3. Market shares by order of entry 
 
4.3. Corrected estimates in case of endogeneity 
 
We finally address the possibility of endogeneity between the changes in the 
penetration rate and the growth of market share of entrants.15 If endogeneity is present 
the error term of the equation is not independent of the value of the penetration rate 
anymore. Without correcting for endogeneity the estimated parameters, especially the 
one measuring the effect of the change in penetration rate, may be biased. A method 
to deal with (possible) endogeneity is to build a system of equations, one for the 
                                                 
15 Note that this is a different type of endogeneity than the one discussed in the Introduction. 
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market share and one for the penetration rate, and estimate its parameters 
simultaneously. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data about other potentially relevant 
variables, it is impossible to build such a system of equations and estimate its 
parameters. Given our data set, this inevitably would lead to identification problems 
of parameters.  
 
Another method to correct for possible endogeneity is to use an Instrumental Variable 
(IV) method.16 If the change in the penetration rate is truly exogenous the OLS-
estimator is unbiased and efficient. Although the IV-estimator is then also unbiased it 
is less efficient. If, however, endogeneity is a problem the OLS-estimator is no longer 
unbiased, while the IV-estimator remains unbiased. Based on two such estimators, 
where one estimator is unbiased and asymptotically efficient under the null hypothesis 
of no endogeneity, but biased and inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis of 
endogeneity, and the other estimator is consistent both under the null and the 
alternative hypotheses, Hausman (1978) suggests a simple test on endogeneity. The 
test exploits that if the regression equation is extended to include one additional 
variable that represents the projection of the potential endogenous change in 
penetration rate on its instruments an (OLS) estimator of the coefficient of this extra 
variable will be equal to zero if the penetration rate is exogenous. A test on 
endogeneity is, therefore, a student’s t-test on the significance of this extra variable. 
As an instrument/proxy for the (possible) endogenous change in the penetration rate 
in country X where a new introduction has taken place we used the average change in 
penetration rates in other countries from the moment the penetration rate is equal to 
the penetration rate in country X. 
 
Table 1 reports the results in the “IV column”. It appears that the IV-estimates are 
different from the OLS-estimates for the first few months, but not for later months. 
The last column of the table gives the Hausman t-values of the coefficient of the extra 
variable. As all the Hausman t-values are below 2 the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected, implying that although the IV-estimates for the effect of a change in 
penetration rate seem to differ in the first 3 months after entry, the Hausman test does 
not reject the exogeneity of the change in penetration rate for these times. We 
                                                 
16 Loosely speaking: A good instrument is (highly) correlated with the variable it instruments but not 
with the error of the equation. 
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conclude that endogeneity is not an issue. As the OLS-estimates are unbiased and 
efficient in this case, these estimated values seem to be the most reliable. As 
endogeneity in the sense of this Section does not seem to be a problem, we do not 
have to adjust our dynamic analysis either. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
In this paper we have analyzed empirically to what extent later entrants in the 
European mobile telephony industry have a disadvantage vis-à-vis incumbents and 
early mover entrants. To analyze this question we have considered a series of static 
models and a dynamic model of market share development. In each of the static 
models, we have regressed the percentage of new users an entrant is able to acquire on 
the number of incumbents at the moment of entry and the change in penetration rate 
from the moment of entry onwards. We find strong evidence for early mover 
advantage. The advantage is, however, mainly caused by the influence of the 
penetration rate: it pays to enter when still few people have acquired a mobile 
telephone. In the dynamic model, we explain the market share in each month by 
factors such as changes in the penetration rate, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index at the 
moment of entry and a country dummy. All variables that explain the ultimate market 
are highly significant. As expected it is significantly easier to enter (i) when the 
penetration rate is still quite low and (ii) in a highly concentrated industry. We also 
find important differences between countries possibly indicating the relative strength 
of the national regulators. It is, for example, relatively difficult to enter the mobile 
telephony sector and gain market share in the Scandinavian countries. We also 
provide indications for the size of the different effects. Depending on the specific 
conditions of entry, it seems fair to conclude that the first entrant may still gain a large 
market share, but that subsequent entrants have much more difficulties gaining market 
share.  
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Appendix: Information about Market Players and Their 
Date of Entry, Organized by Country 
 
We first present a table with incumbents and then a table with market entrants with 
their date of entry. 
 
Country  Operator Date of introduction17 
Austria PTV Austria / Mobilkom (November) 1984 
Belgium Belgacom Mobile (Proximus) (April) 1987 
Denmark TDC (Tele Danmark Mobile) (January) 1982 
Finland Telia Sonera (March) 1982 
France Orange France (November) 1985 
Germany T-Mobile (September) 1985 
Greece no incumbent firm before 1990 
Vodafone 
TIM (STET Hellas) 
 
(July) 1993 
(July) 1993 
Ireland Vodafone (Eircell) (December) 1985 
Italy TIM (September) 1985 
Netherlands KPN (January) 1985 
Norway Telenor Mobil (November) 1981 
Portugal TMN (January) 1989 
Spain Telefonica Moviles (June) 1982 
Sweden Telia Mobitel (October) 1981 
Switzerland Swisscom (September) 1987 
United Kingdom O2 (BT Cellnet) 
Vodafone 
(January) 1985 
(January) 1985 
Source:  File West Europe countries.xls 
Table A.1. Incumbent parties organized by country 
 
                                                 
17 The date of introduction is defined as the moment there is at least one subscriber. This date is not 
always equal to the official month of introduction. For date of introductions before 1998 we have put 
the month between brackets because for this period we lack monthly data.  
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Country  Operator Date of introduction18  
Austria T-Mobile (Max.Mobil) 
Connect Austria/ONE 
tele.ring 
3 Austria (H3G) 
(October) 1996 
December 1998 
June 2000 
June 2003 
Belgium Mobistar 
Base (KPN Orange) 
(August) 1996 
April 1999 
Denmark Sonofon  
TeliaSonera Denmark 
Orange Denmark (Mobilix) 
3 Denmark 
(July) 1992 
January 1998 
March 1998 
December 2003 
Finland Elisa Mobile (Radiolinja) 
DNA Finland (Finnet) 
Telia Finland Mobile 
(January) 1992 
February 1998 
September 1998 
France SFR 
Bouygues Telecom 
(August) 1989 
(May) 1996 
Germany Vodafone D2 (Mannesmann) 
E-Plus 
O2 (Viag Interkom) 
(June) 1992 
(May) 1994 
October 1998 
Greece Cosmote  
Q-Telecom 
April 1998 
July 2002 
Ireland O2 (Esat Digifone) 
Meteor 
(March) 1997 
March 2001 
Italy Vodafone (Omnitel) 
Wind 
Blutel 
3 Italy 
(October) 1995 
March 1999 
June 2000 
March 2003 
Netherlands Vodafone 
Telfort (O2) 
Orange (Dutchtone) 
T-Mobile (Ben) 
(September) 1995 
December 1998 
February 1999 
February 1999 
Norway Netcom (September) 1993 
Portugal Vodafone (Telecel) 
Optimus 
1993 
September 1998 
Spain Vodafone (Airtel) (October) 1995 
                                                 
18 The date of introduction is defined as the moment there is at least one subscriber. This date is not 
always equal to the official month of introduction. For date of introductions before 1998 we have put 
the month between brackets because for this period we lack monthly data.   
 26
Amena February 1999 
Sweden Comviq/Tele2 AB  
Vodafone (NordicTel/Europolitan) 
3 Sweden (H3G) 
(September) 1992 
1993 
June 2003 
Switzerland TDC Switzerland (DiAx/Sunrise) 
Orange Communications (OCSA) 
December 1998 
June 1999 
United Kingdom T-Mobile (One2One) 
Orange PCS 
3 UK 
(September) 1993 
(April) 1994 
March 2003 
Source:  File West Europe countries.xls 
Table A.2. Market entrants organized by country 
 
